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Abstract
Health targets have become a widely used instrument 
to promote population health. We describe the experience 
in England, where the use of targets has reached the 
most advanced stage of development, and other European 
countries. The experience demonstrates that targets may 
change the behavior of a health system, probably to a 
larger extent than many other policy instruments, if incen-
tives are aligned correctly and if measures to deal with 
unintended effects are put in place.
Introduction
Health targets are a tool designed to improve health and 
health system performance. They have been widely used 
in Europe, and governments that use them express a com-
mitment to achieving specified results in a defined time 
and monitoring progress toward broader goals and objec-
tives. Targets may be quantitative (eg, an increase of the 
vaccination rate by X%) or qualitative (eg, the introduction 
of a national screening program), and they may be based 
on health outcomes (eg, reduction in deaths) or processes 
(eg, screening activity). The introduction of the concept 
into the health sector is often traced to the publication of 
the World Health Organization’s Health for All strategy 
in 1981 (1).
A large body of literature reflects the growing and sus-
tained interest of governments in health targets and their 
role in the health system (2). This literature distinguishes 
aspirational, managerial, and technical targets, ranked in 
terms of the extent to which they prescribe what should be 
achieved and how (3). We discuss the experience in Europe 
with health targets as a means of promoting population 
health, with a particular focus on England where the use 
of targets has reached the most advanced stage of develop-
ment (4).
Targets in the English Health System
The first concerted attempt to introduce targets into 
English public health was the Health of the Nation strat-
egy, launched in 1992 (5). The intent was to encourage 
local health authorities to focus on securing good health 
for their population. Initially, 5 key areas were selected for 
action: coronary heart disease and stroke, cancer, mental 
illness, HIV/AIDS and sexual health, and accidents.
In 1998, an independent evaluation of Health of the Nation 
concluded that its “impact on policy documents peaked as 
early as 1993; and, by 1997, its impact on local policy-
making was negligible” (6). Health authorities thought they 
had more pressing concerns than public health, and there-
fore concentrated on operational issues such as reducing 
waiting times and securing budgetary control.
When Tony Blair became prime minister in 1997, his 
government was committed to evidence-based policy, 
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systematic priority setting, and explicit performance tar-
gets throughout public services. In 1998, his government 
implemented a series of public service agreements (PSAs) 
with each ministry to signal priorities for all government 
activity. These priorities were a series of specific objectives, 
expressed as a measurable target, and were expected to be 
achieved in a designated time.
A distinctive feature of PSAs was the intent to focus on 
the outcomes of the public services, rather than opera-
tional activities. The PSA process signaled the govern-
ment’s determination to make the management of public 
services more transparent and to give departments clear 
statements of priorities. To illustrate the issues, we use 
the 2004 PSA targets in health and health care, which 
were based on 4 broad objectives (7): 1) improve the 
health of the population, that is, increase life expectancy 
at birth to 78.6 years for men and to 82.5 years for women 
by 2010; 2) improve health outcomes for people with 
long-term conditions; 3) improve access to services, in 
particular waiting times; and 4) improve the patient and 
user experience.
A central role of the health ministry was to devise opera-
tional instruments that transmit these national PSA tar-
gets to the local level. The most important initiative was 
developing a system of “performance ratings” for individual 
National Health Service organizations. Every organization 
was ranked annually on a 4-point scale (0-3 stars) accord-
ing to a series of approximately 40 performance indicators 
intended to reflect the objectives of the National Health 
Service, as embodied in the PSA targets (8).
Performance ratings have improved some aspects of 
health services (9). For example, long waits for nonurgent 
inpatient treatment were rapidly eliminated. Moreover, tar-
geted aspects of English health care have improved mark-
edly compared with health care in Wales and Scotland, 
which have no PSAs or performance ratings (10).
It has proved less straightforward, however, to estab-
lish effective local targets from objectives such as reduc-
tions in deaths from heart disease and cancer, reductions 
of health inequalities, and reductions in rates of smok-
ing, childhood obesity, and teenage pregnancy. Local 
managers have concentrated on readily managed aspects 
of health care, and public health has not received the 
sustained managerial attention given to the targets for 
health service delivery (11).
The PSA system has nevertheless led to sustained 
monitoring of the chosen population health targets and 
health disparities, and the ministry is held accountable 
for performance. The health inequalities targets have been 
regularly monitored by an external advisory group, but it 
is not clear why and how the targets were chosen, whether 
the observed improvements are attributable to the efforts 
of the health ministry, and what action should be taken 
when the measured performance indicated a possible fail-
ure to achieve a target (12).
A parallel initiative has been the development of a qual-
ity and outcomes framework (QOF) incentives scheme for 
primary care physicians (general practitioners). The QOF 
is one of the most ambitious attempts yet to combine clini-
cal quality targets and incentives into physician remu-
neration (13). It emphasizes clinical prevention, and the 
earnings of individual practitioners are at risk if they 
do not meet quality goals. The intention is that the pri-
mary care interventions it encourages, such as smoking 
cessation advice, blood pressure and cholesterol control, 
and regular monitoring of chronic disease, will lead to 
a healthier population and will reduce future health 
care expenditures. Regrettably, researchers have been 
hampered in efforts to evaluate its success in improving 
health by the lack of reliable baseline data against which 
to measure improvements in health attributable to the 
QOF (14).
Targets have certainly delivered noteworthy successes 
in England, such as the more equitable management of 
coronary heart disease across ethnic groups (15). However, 
alongside the improvements in many of the measured 
targets are widespread reports of adverse side effects (16). 
Examples include neglect of unmeasured aspects of perfor-
mance (eg, clinical priorities being sacrificed in the pursuit 
of reduced waiting times), distorted behavior (such as 
refusing to admit patients to accident departments until 
a 4-hour waiting time target was achievable), and fraud. 
Unintended and adverse responses such as these were 
predictable. They reflect the potential power of targets in 
affecting behavior but also emphasize the need to consider 
the incentives inherent in any targets regime and the need 
to use counteracting instruments where necessary (17).
Discussing the Lessons
Drawing on the experience of England and case studies 
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from other countries (2), we discuss 6 lessons that arise 
from the use of population health targets.
Who should choose the targets?
In principle, it seems laudable for an elected government 
to set out its objectives and targets in an explicit fashion. 
Targets serve many purposes, but one is to enhance the 
accountability of government to parliament and the elec-
torate. Lack of an adequate accountability framework may 
lead to the failure of target setting to achieve its objectives. 
For example, in Hungary, where accountability arrange-
ments were not aligned with the public health focus of tar-
gets (18), achievement was monitored at the national level, 
but no mechanism secured the commitment of organiza-
tions and practitioners capable of influencing outcomes.
The English process succeeded in that much of the 
public debate surrounding targets referred less to the 
principle of setting targets and more to the details of what 
those targets should be. Disagreement remains about the 
processes by which priorities are chosen and targets set. 
For example, there is an argument that the health service 
professionals should have more say in influencing the 
nature of targets, when outcomes rely so heavily on their 
engagement and commitment. However, the priorities 
and working practices of those professionals may impede 
progress toward better performance. To some extent, 
outcome-related targets seek to challenge traditional 
ways of delivering services and will, therefore, at times 
come into conflict with the professions.
Some commentators argue that service users should 
have more say in setting targets. Wide consultation 
with user groups can identify priorities for improve-
ment. However, particularly in population health, setting 
objectives involves considerations beyond the immediate 
beneficiaries of a particular service, such as the taxpayer 
perspective, the interests of future users, and the interests 
of users of other services. The user perspective cannot be 
the sole influence on priority setting.
Consensus and ownership have nevertheless been seen 
as imperative to elicit acceptance of country-based tar-
gets. In Catalonia, health councils were created at the 
central and provincial levels to encourage citizens’ groups 
to take an active part in target setting (19). In Flanders, 
local health networks were established to encourage 
the exchange of information between local organizations 
and offer a focal point for preventive actions (20). France 
established national and regional health conferences that 
allowed stakeholders the opportunity to debate existing 
health problems and foster partnerships (21).
Any government seeking to implement population health 
targets should reach consensus concerning the choice of 
objectives and the nature of the targets by consulting with 
relevant stakeholders. However, uncritical accommoda-
tion of every interest group would render the target pro-
cess meaningless; for example, it could lead to an unwieldy 
proliferation of priorities. A prime role of government is to 
balance conflicting claims on public resources, and targets 
should, in the end, be an explicit and succinct statement of 
the government’s choice in that respect.
How many targets should be chosen?
Multiple objectives are an inescapable characteristic of 
health services. However, one of the intentions of any tar-
gets regime is to focus on a limited number of objectives. 
Many schemes have failed to recognize this, for example 
in Italy (100 targets) and Andalucía (84 targets) (22). In 
England, after some early failures, later PSAs focused on 
a reduced number of targets.
If a domain is not included in the targets regime, this 
is not necessarily an indication that it is unimportant. 
Rather, the key focus of targets should be where change is 
required, and maintenance of standards in other domains 
should be secured through other instruments, such as rou-
tine regulation, inspection, or market mechanisms.
When should outcomes be used as a basis for targets?
In principle, a focus on outcomes should enable health 
care providers to look beyond traditional organizational 
boundaries and ways of delivering their services. However, 
some outcomes are intrinsically difficult to measure. Even 
if they can be measured, outcomes such as reduced deaths 
from smoking can take years to materialize, beyond the 
lifetime of most governments. Furthermore, many public 
health outcomes are particularly vulnerable to influences 
beyond the control of health agencies. Each of these diffi-
culties offers those agencies an excuse for apparent failure 
and can undermine the targets process.
Conversely, the use of process measures can distort 
behavior and lead to unintended effects. For example, the 
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QOF “smoking cessation” target may have led to an undue 
emphasis on delivering advisory consultations without 
any attention to outcomes in the form of sustained ces-
sation. If such process targets are used, additional assur-
ance may be needed to ensure that the desired outcomes 
have been secured. Although outcome measures address 
what matters and are less vulnerable to distortion, there 
will be occasions when a carefully chosen process mea-
sure — one that evidence shows is clearly linked to the 
eventual outcome — may form a more effective basis for 
a target.
How should targets be quantified?
Once objectives have been identified, a central feature of 
the debate becomes how the associated targets should be 
set, in terms of the measurement instrument to be used 
and the level of attainment to be required. The literature 
suggests that targets should be SMART — specific, mea-
surable, achievable, realistic, and timed (3). The Royal 
Statistical Society (23) presents a set of desirable general 
principles for setting targets, which include following:
1. Indicators should be directly relevant to the primary 
objective or be an obviously adequate proxy measure.
2. Definitions need to be precise, practicable, and consis-
tent over time.
3. Indicators should be straightforward to interpret and 
avoid perverse incentives.
4. Indicators should be based on adequate sample sizes, 
and technical properties of the indicator should be 
satisfactory.
5. Indicators should not impose an undue burden in 
terms of cost, personnel, or intrusion on those provid-
ing the information.
In practice, few targets regimes have adhered to prin-
ciples such as these. For example, Swedish public health 
targets were not explicit enough to act as a lever for opera-
tional action (24). Some targets might be little more than 
unattainable aspirations, while others can be secured with 
little effort on the part of ministries. Furthermore, conflict-
ing pressures exist in any targets regime. To be effective 
managerial instruments, targets should be stretching but 
attainable, suggesting (for example) a 1 in 3 risk of failure. 
However, few governments would want to be confronted 
with such a high proportion of failures. From an account-
ability perspective, a government would wish to think that 
all targets could be attained.
This scenario occurred in the Netherlands during the 
early 1990s, where the secretary of state for health 
avoided using quantitative health targets because of 
the political accountability those targets would create 
(3). Similarly, Russia has experienced politically driven 
target setting, where the targets set were neither rel-
evant nor necessary. Health was seldom a priority on the 
policy agenda in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
or subsequently in the Russian Federation, and gener-
ally, when targets were set they were broadly defined, 
infrastructure-oriented, and almost never outcome- 
oriented. In many cases, the targets required no change in 
policy to achieve them (25). It is difficult to see how this 
tension can be satisfactorily resolved, unless the political 
process becomes mature enough to recognize that some 
failure is inevitable and not necessarily adverse if progress 
is being secured.
How should cross-ministerial targets be handled?
Given the many determinants of health, involving 
actions by organizations in various sectors, effective 
coordination among responsible actors has emerged as 
a key issue. In particular, a focus on health outcomes 
sometimes gives rise to strategies that are not obviously 
attached to a particular ministry, leading to the need 
to specify “joint” targets that transcend departmental 
boundaries. These are particularly important in the 
public health domain. An assessment of the English 
childhood obesity PSA target found no ready solutions 
but advocated much stronger collaboration between 
national and local government and stronger engagement 
with nongovernmental organizations (26). Cross-sectoral 
targets give rise to problems of coordination, persuasion, 
and engagement that must be addressed if they are to 
be successful.
Where this coordination takes place will depend on the 
governance structures already in place and the forums 
in which key actors can meet. This may be easier where 
responsibility for health lies in local or regional govern-
ment, as in Scandinavia. Other countries have faced a dif-
ferent challenge with intersectoral targets. Although they 
have stressed the need to involve the many sectors whose 
actions contribute to health, they have often not included 
the health care sector itself. By not including that sector, 
health targets become a peripheral issue, thereby diluting 
the potential effect of that sector (27).
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How should national objectives be transmitted to local 
organizations?
Attainment of national targets usually relies on improve-
ment in local organizations charged with delivering ser-
vices. It would, however, be inappropriate to set the same 
targets for every locality regardless of its existing level of 
attainment and the difficulty of the local circumstances. 
Organizations already performing well would have no 
incentive to improve, whilst those with disadvantaged 
populations might stand no chance of success and become 
alienated. If such regimes were sustained, it may become 
difficult to recruit key managers and professionals in 
disadvantaged areas, exacerbating existing problems. As 
a result, many countries have introduced more subtle tar-
gets regimes for local organizations, seeking to encourage 
all organizations to improve in the chosen measures, from 
whatever baseline they start.
The tension between national objectives and local discre-
tion has become an unresolved issue in targets regimes. 
In England, the “must do” nature of local health targets 
put pressure on some local organizations, precluding any 
serious consideration of separate local priorities. The pre-
vailing lack of flexibility was highlighted in a report by 
the Audit Commission (28) that criticized the neglect of 
local government discretion in earlier PSA targets. There 
is now increased interest in England on public reporting 
of local levels of attainment, regardless of which agency 
is nominally accountable (29). In short, targets programs 
have often been disseminated in a top-down manner with 
little effort to ensure involvement of key actors at the 
grassroots level (27). For the future, a sense of ownership 
and accountability needs to be developed among those who 
implement health targets.
Conclusion
Health targets have become a widely used instrument to 
promote population health. The lessons we have described 
demonstrate that targets may secure a real change in the 
behavior of a health system, probably to a larger extent 
than many other policy instruments, if incentives are 
aligned correctly and if measures to deal with unintended 
effects are put in place.
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